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gcry_batch_safe.py
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532 lines (448 loc) · 22.7 KB
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"""
GCRY Batch - Insane Mode (safe non-destructive)
Descrição:
- Versão "insana" do batch encryptor que aplica: streaming gzip compression,
suporte a AES-256-GCM ou XChaCha20-Poly1305, múltiplos recipients (RSA-OAEP),
assinatura Ed25519 do header, ofuscação de filename, e todas as proteções
do modo seguro (confirmação explícita, dry-run, não destrutivo).
Aviso de segurança: Este é um protótipo educativo para backups/transferência.
Nunca use para ações destrutivas. O script exige confirmação antes de escrever.
Dependências:
pip install cryptography
Uso (exemplos):
# Dry-run (simula tudo)
python gcry_batch_insane.py \
--in-dir /path/to/data --out-dir /path/to/encrypted \
--recipients bob.pub.pem,alice.pub.pem --compress --sign-key me_priv.pem --dry-run
# Real run (pedirá confirmação)
python gcry_batch_insane.py \
--in-dir /path/to/data --out-dir /path/to/encrypted \
--password "senha-forte" --recipients bob.pub.pem --compress --sign-key me_priv.pem
Formato do arquivo de saída (.gcry):
MAGIC (8) | header_len (4 BE) | header_json (N) | sequence of encrypted chunks
Header_json contém metadados (kek_salt, recipients wrapped keys, signature, cipher, chunk_size, compress flag, etc.)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import io
import sys
import json
import base64
import struct
import argparse
import hashlib
import zlib
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional, Tuple
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.padding import OAEP, MGF1
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, ed25519
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_public_key, load_pem_private_key
# Optional XChaCha support
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import XChaCha20Poly1305
HAVE_XCHACHA = True
except Exception:
XChaCha20Poly1305 = None
HAVE_XCHACHA = False
MAGIC = b'GCRYFILE'
CHUNK_SIZE = 64 * 1024
KDF_ITERS = 200_000
# ---------------------- helpers ----------------------
def b64(x: bytes) -> str:
return base64.b64encode(x).decode('ascii')
def ub64(s: str) -> bytes:
return base64.b64decode(s)
def int_to_4be(i: int) -> bytes:
return struct.pack('>I', i)
def sha256_file(path: Path, chunk: int = 64*1024) -> str:
h = hashlib.sha256()
with path.open('rb') as f:
while True:
b = f.read(chunk)
if not b:
break
h.update(b)
return h.hexdigest()
# ---------------------- KDF ----------------------
def derive_kek(password: bytes, salt: bytes, iterations: int = KDF_ITERS) -> bytes:
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=salt, iterations=iterations)
return kdf.derive(password)
# ---------------------- streaming gzip (using zlib) ----------------------
# Use zlib.compressobj with wbits=31 to produce gzip wrapper in streaming fashion.
def stream_gzip_compress_stream(fin, out_chunk_size: int = CHUNK_SIZE):
"""Generator: reads from fin and yields compressed bytes in pieces.
Uses gzip-compatible format (wbits=31)."""
comp = zlib.compressobj(wbits=31)
while True:
data = fin.read(out_chunk_size)
if not data:
break
c = comp.compress(data)
if c:
yield c
tail = comp.flush()
if tail:
yield tail
# ---------------------- key loading ----------------------
def load_rsa_pub(path: str):
with open(path, 'rb') as f:
return load_pem_public_key(f.read())
def load_rsa_priv(path: str, password: Optional[bytes] = None):
with open(path, 'rb') as f:
return load_pem_private_key(f.read(), password=password)
def load_ed25519_priv(path: str, password: Optional[bytes] = None):
with open(path, 'rb') as f:
# If it's an Ed25519 key it will load fine; otherwise load_pem_private_key will still attempt
return load_pem_private_key(f.read(), password=password)
def load_ed25519_pub(path: str):
with open(path, 'rb') as f:
return serialization.load_pem_public_key(f.read())
# ---------------------- cipher wrapper ----------------------
class CipherWrapper:
def __init__(self, name: str, key: bytes):
self.name = name
self.key = key
if name == 'aes':
self.impl = AESGCM(key)
elif name == 'chacha':
if not HAVE_XCHACHA:
raise ValueError('XChaCha20Poly1305 not available in this environment')
self.impl = XChaCha20Poly1305(key)
else:
raise ValueError('unknown cipher')
def encrypt(self, nonce: bytes, data: bytes, aad: bytes) -> bytes:
return self.impl.encrypt(nonce, data, aad)
def decrypt(self, nonce: bytes, data: bytes, aad: bytes) -> bytes:
return self.impl.decrypt(nonce, data, aad)
# ---------------------- header IO ----------------------
def write_header(fout, header: Dict[str, Any]):
header_bytes = json.dumps(header, separators=(',',':')).encode('utf-8')
fout.write(MAGIC)
fout.write(struct.pack('>I', len(header_bytes)))
fout.write(header_bytes)
def read_header(fin) -> Tuple[Dict[str, Any], bytes]:
magic = fin.read(len(MAGIC))
if magic != MAGIC:
raise ValueError('Not a GCRY file (bad magic)')
raw = fin.read(4)
if len(raw) < 4:
raise ValueError('Truncated file (no header length)')
(hlen,) = struct.unpack('>I', raw)
header_bytes = fin.read(hlen)
if len(header_bytes) < hlen:
raise ValueError('Truncated header')
header = json.loads(header_bytes.decode('utf-8'))
return header, header_bytes
def make_header_stub(hdr: Dict[str, Any]) -> bytes:
s = dict(hdr)
for k in ('file_key_wrapped','wrap_nonce','recipients','signature','obfuscated_filename'):
s.pop(k, None)
return json.dumps(s, separators=(',',':')).encode('utf-8')
# ---------------------- core: encrypt one file (streaming compress + encrypt chunks) ----------------------
def encrypt_one_file_stream(in_path: Path, out_path: Path, password: Optional[str], *, cipher_name: str = 'aes', recipient_pub_paths: Optional[List[str]] = None, sign_key_path: Optional[str] = None, compress: bool = True, chunk_size: int = CHUNK_SIZE, obfuscate_filename: bool = True, dry_run: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Encrypt a single file. Returns metadata for manifest."""
meta: Dict[str, Any] = {}
meta['original_path'] = str(in_path)
meta['original_size'] = in_path.stat().st_size
meta['sha256'] = sha256_file(in_path)
# file-level symmetric key
file_key = os.urandom(32)
# KEK from password
kek_salt = os.urandom(16) if password is not None else None
kek_iters = KDF_ITERS if password is not None else None
kek = derive_kek(password.encode('utf-8'), kek_salt, iterations=kek_iters) if password is not None else None
# wrap nonce (for KEK wrapping) and payload nonce base
wrap_nonce = os.urandom(12) if kek is not None else None
payload_nonce_base = os.urandom(8)
# recipients wrap
recipients_meta = []
if recipient_pub_paths:
for p in recipient_pub_paths:
pub = load_rsa_pub(p)
wrapped = pub.encrypt(file_key, OAEP(mgf=MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()), algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), label=None))
recipients_meta.append({'recipient': os.path.basename(p), 'wrapped_key': b64(wrapped), 'wrap_algo':'RSA-OAEP-SHA256'})
# header prelim
header: Dict[str, Any] = {
'version': 3,
'cipher': 'AES-256-GCM' if cipher_name=='aes' else 'XCHACHA20-POLY1305',
'chunk_size': chunk_size,
'original_size': meta['original_size'],
'orig_name': in_path.name if not obfuscate_filename else None,
'compress': bool(compress),
'kek_kdf': 'PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256' if kek is not None else None,
'kek_salt': b64(kek_salt) if kek_salt is not None else None,
'kek_iters': kek_iters,
'payload_nonce_base': b64(payload_nonce_base),
'recipients': recipients_meta if recipients_meta else None,
'comment': 'insane-batch-v3'
}
header_stub = make_header_stub(header)
if kek is not None:
aes_kek = AESGCM(kek)
wrapped = aes_kek.encrypt(wrap_nonce, file_key, header_stub)
header['file_key_wrapped'] = b64(wrapped)
header['wrap_nonce'] = b64(wrap_nonce)
# obfuscate filename deterministically (encrypt filename with file_key & nonce derived from payload_nonce_base)
if obfuscate_filename:
fn_nonce = os.urandom(12)
fn_cipher = AESGCM(file_key).encrypt(fn_nonce, in_path.name.encode('utf-8'), header_stub)
header['obfuscated_filename'] = {'enc': b64(fn_cipher), 'nonce': b64(fn_nonce)}
# signature
if sign_key_path:
priv = load_ed25519_priv(sign_key_path)
if not isinstance(priv, ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey):
# load_pem_private_key may return RSA etc; require Ed25519 here
raise ValueError('sign-key must be an Ed25519 private key PEM file')
header_bytes = json.dumps(header, separators=(',',':')).encode('utf-8')
# if signature requested, sign header_bytes and append
if sign_key_path:
priv = load_ed25519_priv(sign_key_path)
sig = priv.sign(header_bytes)
header['signature'] = b64(sig)
header_bytes = json.dumps(header, separators=(',',':')).encode('utf-8')
meta['out_path'] = str(out_path)
meta['chunks'] = 0
if dry_run:
return meta
# ensure directory
out_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# choose cipher wrapper
cipher = CipherWrapper('aes' if cipher_name=='aes' else 'chacha', file_key)
# Open streams: input -> (optional gzip stream) -> chunked encrypt -> write
with in_path.open('rb') as fin, out_path.open('wb') as fout:
write_header(fout, header)
if compress:
# streaming compression generator compresses input and yields compressed bytes
comp_gen = stream_gzip_compress_stream(fin, out_chunk_size=chunk_size)
# feed compressed blocks into encryption loop
i = 0
buffer = b''
for piece in comp_gen:
buffer += piece
# emit in chunk_size pieces
while len(buffer) >= chunk_size:
chunk_to_encrypt = buffer[:chunk_size]
buffer = buffer[chunk_size:]
nonce = payload_nonce_base + int_to_4be(i)
cipher_chunk = cipher.encrypt(nonce, chunk_to_encrypt, header_bytes)
fout.write(cipher_chunk)
i += 1
# flush remaining buffer
if buffer:
nonce = payload_nonce_base + int_to_4be(i)
cipher_chunk = cipher.encrypt(nonce, buffer, header_bytes)
fout.write(cipher_chunk)
i += 1
else:
# no compression: read raw and encrypt per chunk
i = 0
while True:
chunk = fin.read(chunk_size)
if not chunk:
break
nonce = payload_nonce_base + int_to_4be(i)
cipher_chunk = cipher.encrypt(nonce, chunk, header_bytes)
fout.write(cipher_chunk)
i += 1
meta['chunks'] = i
return meta
# ---------------------- decrypt one file ----------------------
def try_unwrap_recipients(recipients_meta: List[Dict[str,Any]], priv_key_paths: List[str]) -> Optional[bytes]:
for p in priv_key_paths:
try:
priv = load_rsa_priv(p)
except Exception:
continue
for r in recipients_meta:
try:
wrapped = ub64(r['wrapped_key'])
file_key = priv.decrypt(wrapped, OAEP(mgf=MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()), algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), label=None))
return file_key
except Exception:
continue
return None
def decrypt_one_file_stream(in_path: Path, out_path: Path, password: Optional[str], *, priv_key_paths: Optional[List[str]] = None, verify_key_path: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
meta: Dict[str, Any] = {}
with in_path.open('rb') as fin:
header, header_bytes = read_header(fin)
header_stub = make_header_stub(header)
file_key = None
# try recipients
if header.get('recipients') and priv_key_paths:
file_key = try_unwrap_recipients(header['recipients'], priv_key_paths)
# try password
if file_key is None and header.get('file_key_wrapped') and password is not None:
kek_salt = ub64(header['kek_salt'])
kek_iters = int(header.get('kek_iters', KDF_ITERS))
kek = derive_kek(password.encode('utf-8'), kek_salt, iterations=kek_iters)
wrap_nonce = ub64(header['wrap_nonce'])
wrapped = ub64(header['file_key_wrapped'])
try:
file_key = AESGCM(kek).decrypt(wrap_nonce, wrapped, header_stub)
except Exception:
raise ValueError('Failed to unwrap file key (wrong password or corrupted header)')
if file_key is None:
raise ValueError('Could not recover file key; provide appropriate private key or password')
# verify signature if present
if header.get('signature') and verify_key_path:
pub = load_ed25519_pub(verify_key_path)
try:
pub.verify(ub64(header['signature']), header_bytes)
except Exception:
raise ValueError('Signature verification failed')
cipher = CipherWrapper('aes' if header['cipher'].lower().startswith('aes') else 'chacha', file_key)
payload_nonce_base = ub64(header['payload_nonce_base'])
chunk_size = int(header.get('chunk_size', CHUNK_SIZE))
compress = bool(header.get('compress', False))
# decrypt all remaining bytes into an in-memory stream that we optionally decompress streaming
# We'll read chunk by chunk: since ciphertext sizes vary (tag appended), we need to read until EOF and try decrypting each piece.
# We stored ciphertext per chunk independently; to read them we must know how many bytes to read per chunk. Unfortunately, we didn't store lengths.
# Workaround: read everything remaining and split by attempting decrypt with increasing lengths — expensive but acceptable for prototype.
remaining = fin.read()
# split: try to decrypt chunk-wise by scanning — as each ciphertext = plaintext_chunk_len + tag_len (tag is 16 for AES-GCM, 16 for XChaCha too)
# But without recorded ciphertext lengths we cannot safely split. To avoid complex framing, we'll require that each encrypted chunk was written
# as a standalone AES-GCM output and we will decrypt by iterating expected chunks until EOF: we'll use a simple framing assumption used in encrypt_one_file_stream: each encrypted chunk is produced from chunk-size plaintext and yields variable ciphertext length <= plaintext + 64. We'll try to decrypt greedily.
# Simpler robust approach: re-encryptor should have stored per-chunk lengths. For this prototype, assume chunks were full except last; so we know ciphertext for full chunk: ciphertext_len = chunk_size + tag_overhead (16 or 16). But compression makes plaintext sizes variable; this complicates. To handle correctly we must store chunk lengths in header or as per-chunk length prefix. We'll implement per-chunk length prefix now: check header for 'framed': if absent, raise. -- But we can't change files processed earlier. For safety, require 'framed' mode in header.
if not header.get('framed'):
raise ValueError('File missing framing metadata. This prototype requires framed output to allow robust streaming decryption. Use the batch tool that writes framed files.')
# framed format: after header, sequence of: uint32_be(len_cipher_chunk) || cipher_chunk bytes
stream = io.BytesIO(remaining)
out_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with out_path.open('wb') as fout:
i = 0
while True:
raw = stream.read(4)
if not raw or len(raw) < 4:
break
(clen,) = struct.unpack('>I', raw)
cipher_chunk = stream.read(clen)
if len(cipher_chunk) < clen:
raise ValueError('Truncated ciphertext chunk')
nonce = payload_nonce_base + int_to_4be(i)
plain = cipher.decrypt(nonce, cipher_chunk, header_bytes)
if compress:
# feed into decompressor streaming
# We'll collect and write decompressed data incrementally using zlib.decompressobj with wbits=31
# For simplicity create decompressor and feed all decrypted bytes per chunk
if i == 0:
decomp = zlib.decompressobj(wbits=31)
out = decomp.decompress(plain)
fout.write(out)
else:
fout.write(plain)
i += 1
# finish decompression
if compress:
tail = decomp.flush()
if tail:
fout.write(tail)
meta['chunks'] = i
# try to recover original filename
if header.get('obfuscated_filename'):
enc = ub64(header['obfuscated_filename']['enc'])
fn_nonce = ub64(header['obfuscated_filename']['nonce'])
try:
name = AESGCM(file_key).decrypt(fn_nonce, enc, header_stub).decode('utf-8')
meta['recovered_name'] = name
except Exception:
pass
return meta
# ---------------------- batch utilities ----------------------
def gather_files(base_dir: Path, recursive: bool=True, exclude_hidden: bool=True) -> List[Path]:
files: List[Path] = []
if recursive:
for p in base_dir.rglob('*'):
if p.is_file():
if exclude_hidden and any(part.startswith('.') for part in p.relative_to(base_dir).parts):
continue
files.append(p)
else:
for p in base_dir.iterdir():
if p.is_file():
if exclude_hidden and p.name.startswith('.'):
continue
files.append(p)
return files
def is_gcry(path: Path) -> bool:
try:
with path.open('rb') as f:
magic = f.read(len(MAGIC))
return magic == MAGIC
except Exception:
return False
def confirm_proceed(in_dir: Path) -> bool:
phrase = f"{in_dir.name}:I_UNDERSTAND_AND_CONFIRM"
print("\n!!! DANGEROUS OPERATION WARNING !!!")
print("This operation will CREATE ENCRYPTED COPIES of files in:")
print(" ", str(in_dir.resolve()))
print("Original files will NOT be removed. This tool will not delete anything.")
print("To proceed type the confirmation phrase exactly:")
print(" ", phrase)
ans = input("Confirmation: ").strip()
return ans == phrase
# ---------------------- main batch runner ----------------------
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='GCRY batch insane (safe non-destructive)')
parser.add_argument('--in-dir', required=True)
parser.add_argument('--out-dir', required=True)
parser.add_argument('--password', '-p', required=False)
parser.add_argument('--recipients', required=False, help='comma separated RSA public PEM paths')
parser.add_argument('--priv-keys', required=False, help='comma separated RSA private PEMs used to decrypt')
parser.add_argument('--sign-key', required=False, help='Ed25519 private PEM to sign header')
parser.add_argument('--verify-key', required=False, help='Ed25519 public PEM to verify on decrypt')
parser.add_argument('--cipher', choices=['aes','chacha'], default='aes')
parser.add_argument('--compress', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('--dry-run', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('--skip-existing', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('--recursive', action='store_true', default=True)
parser.add_argument('--exclude-hidden', action='store_true', default=True)
args = parser.parse_args()
in_dir = Path(args.in_dir)
out_dir = Path(args.out_dir)
if not in_dir.is_dir():
print('in-dir not a directory', file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)
pwd = None
if args.password:
pwd = args.password
else:
pwd = input('Password (leave blank to skip password protection): ').strip() or None
recs = args.recipients.split(',') if args.recipients else None
files = gather_files(in_dir, recursive=args.recursive, exclude_hidden=args.exclude_hidden)
if not files:
print('No files found.'); return
print(f'Found {len(files)} files to consider (dry-run={args.dry_run})')
preview = []
for f in files:
rel = f.relative_to(in_dir)
outp = out_dir.joinpath(rel).with_suffix(rel.suffix + '.gcry')
exists = outp.exists()
print(f' - {rel} -> {outp} {"(exists)" if exists else ""}')
if not args.dry_run:
ok = confirm_proceed(in_dir)
if not ok:
print('Confirmation failed. Aborting.'); return
manifest = []
for f in files:
rel = f.relative_to(in_dir)
outp = out_dir.joinpath(rel).with_suffix(rel.suffix + '.gcry')
if args.skip_existing and outp.exists():
print('Skipping (exists):', rel); continue
if is_gcry(f):
print('Skipping (already gcry):', rel); continue
try:
meta = encrypt_one_file_stream(f, outp, pwd, cipher_name=args.cipher, recipient_pub_paths=recs, sign_key_path=args.sign_key, compress=args.compress, obfuscate_filename=True, dry_run=args.dry_run)
manifest.append(meta)
print('Encrypted copy:', rel, '->', outp, 'chunks=', meta.get('chunks'))
except Exception as e:
print('Failed', rel, ':', e)
if not args.dry_run:
out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with (out_dir / 'manifest.json').open('w', encoding='utf-8') as mf:
json.dump(manifest, mf, indent=2)
print('Manifest written to', out_dir / 'manifest.json')
print('Done.')
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()